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Metropolitan agriculture is economically important, especially in the Northeast. Wh]le faced
with substantial economic and regulatory obstacles, commercial farming in urban areas is
surviving and even prospering. In terms of standard models of agriculture in economic
development, this is a puzzle. But more detailed, spatial economic models indicate how
labor-intensive production of perishable commodities in urbanized areas can make economic
sense, especially when coupled with environmental amenities that farming generates for
nonfarm people. At the same time, environmental disamenities of agriculture are larger in
densely populated areas. The political economy outcomes have tended to be favorable to
continued farming, albeit with increased regulation. Nonetheless, many questions remain
about the dynamics of agricultural adjustment to urbanization, and the possible steady-state
mix of farm and nonfarm activities.
Agriculture in an urbanized area faces both prob-
lems and opportunities that are specific to such
locations, and which have been somewhat ne-
glected in the main stream of work by agricultural
economists. The most salient current issues in-
volve policy and regulation, generated by the more
intense interaction between farm and nonfarm ac-
tivities that results from close proximity of farm
and nonfarm people, and from increased competi-
tion for natural resources such as water, air qual-
ity, and environmental amenities.
The issues confront more than a small minority
of farmers, especially in the Northeast. About 30
percent of U.S. farms (by the U.S. Census farm
definition) are located in metropolitan statistical
areas, and in the Northeast (New England, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland) a majority of all farms are in metropol-
itan areas (Heimlich and Barnard, 1992). More-
over, the level of commercial activity on these
farms is comparable to farms outside urbanized
areas. In 1989 the mean sales of agricultural prod-
ucts from farms located in metropolitan statistical
areas was $54,100 while the comparable figure for
farms outside metro areas was $53,700, Estimated
net returns to farm assets were $7,800 for metro-
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area farms and $9,100 for nonmetro farms (Heim-
lich and Barnard, 1991),
This paper considers both positive and norma-
tive issues. After discussing the implications of
some basic hypotheses in economic development
and locational economics, a framework for analyz-
ing the policy issues is developed in more detail.
Some pertinent data evidence is then considered.
Economic Development and
Metropolitan Agriculture
Economic development theory tends to emphasize
sharp distinctions between agriculture and the non-
agricultural economy. “Dual economy” models,
for many years the bread and butter of the eco-
nomic development literature, postulate an agricul-
tural sector characterized by backwardness, in
technology, attitudes, and integration with the
market economy. The U.S. domestic literature
adapted some aspects of this idea in work in the
1950s on the “urban-industrial hypothesis. ” The
hypothesis is that rural areas are economically
more stagnant, while growth and industrial devel-
opment are typically based in urbanized areas.
This causes increased factor prices in metropolitan
areas and permits faster adjustment of surplus ag-
ricultural labor to nonfarrn employment. The hy-
pothesis was originally developed by Schultz
(1953) and was elaborated and empirically con-Gardner
firmed by Nicholls (1961), Ruttan (1955), and
Tang (1958) using data of the1940s and 1950s.
Neither the dual economy models nor the urban-
industrial hypothesis have strong a priori ground-
ing. They are empirical propositions that in prin-
ciple could fail as well as succeed as a scientific
explanation. Perhaps the best established building
block in such models is Engel’s Law. The declin-
ing demand for food as compared to nonfood
goods as income grows makes it likely that agri-
culture’s importance in the economy will decline
under economic development. Particular coun-
tries, and regions witbin countries, may remain
agricultural indefinitely because of specialization
and trade, but these areas will tend to shrink in
economic importance in the whole picture.
Under these circumstances one might expect ag-
ricultural retrenchment to hit urbanized areas first
and hardest. However, locational issues bring in
additional complications. These have been ad-
dressed in a literature on spatial economics largely
distinct from the theory of economic development.
What can this literature contribute to our under-
standing of metropolitan agriculture in the United
States?
Spatial economic theory gets off on the wrong
foot by offering a standard model in which the
subject of this article-agriculture in metropolitan
areas-does not exist. The basic von Thuenen
model (see Muth, 1961 or Katzman, 1974) con-
sists of a city surrounded by farming. In Muth’s
two-commodity model, as a city expands, its
boundary expands via rural-to-urban land conver-
sions. In a more current metaphor we might say
farmland is sucked into a black hole of urban de-
velopment.
But as the data on metropolitan areas indicate,
there is actually a great deal of farming life in the
black hole. How are we to understand this in terms
of spatial theory? Lopez, Adelaja, and Andrews
(1988) couch their analysis in terms of the “sub-
urbanization” of agriculture. This is important be-
cause the farming activities to be investigated do
not take place in central cities, but in areas sur-
rounding them that can generally be classified as
suburban. These areas are rightly placed within
metropolitan areas for statistical purposes because
their economic activity is heavily oriented toward
central cities. A large fraction of the residents
commute to the cities and a large fraction of sub-
urban businesses provide services for these com-
muters or urban industries. We have to refine our
thinking not so much about the spatial economics
of agriculture as the spatial economics of nonagri-
cultural industries and residence patterns. Urban
workers choose to live in less densely settled
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places and like greenery, even if they must incur
substantial commuting costs. When enough people
live in suburban areas, it becomes economical for
employers, too, to locate in suburbs.
what are the economic implications of this form
of metropolitan development for agriculture? In
seeking better understanding of suburban agricul-
ture two aspects of its locational economics should
be distinguished: static and dynamic.
The static economics can be seen best in a model
of a steady state in a suburbanized metropolitan
area. Agriculture in such an area is faced by the
following economic differences from a nonmetro-
politan area: (i) greater nonfarrn demand for land,
and hence higher land prices, (ii) differences in
competition and the functioning of product and
factor markets, (iii) comparative advantage in
transport costs of farm goods to nonfarrn buyers,
and (iv) higher population density, hence more
congestion and cost of externalities.
These economic differences have both positive
and negative consequences for agriculture. Higher
land prices imply higher (opportunity) costs of
farm products; but lower transport costs imply
higher farm product prices for metropolitan areas.
Products which are less land intensive (higher
value added per acre) have a comparative advan-
tage in metro areas, as well as products which have
high transportation costs and high perishability.
Apart from less easily transportable products, and
specialized urban demand creating “niche” mar-
kets for specialties of a city, demand preferences
of urban people are expected to be less important.
If urbanites decide they like grass-fed hamburgers
rather than organic vegetables, the beef for the
burgers will still be grown on the distant range
where land prices are low.
Item (ii), differences in the functioning of mar-
kets, has not received much analytical attention
since studies of the urban-industrial hypothesis in
the 1950s and 1960s. It is unclear if the hypothesis
still holds. Reasons for doubt are much lower out-
migration rates from rural areas in recent years;
and higher rural relative to urban incomes. These
changes make the picture of excess resources and
poorly functioning factor markets in rural areas
less plausible. Moreover there is a counter argu-
ment that some farm input and product transactions
costs are higher in metro areas. The greater con-
centration of agricultural activities in rural areas
creates economies of scale and scope that are not
available in metropolitan areas where nonagricul-
tural economic activities congest the infrastructure
for input delivery and bulk output marketing.
The dynamic economics of suburban agriculture
involve the continued growth of urban popula-102 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
tions, and consequent absence of a steady-state
equilibrium. This growth implies that while met-
ropolitan agriculture survives, it continually
shrinks in acreage. What does this mean for the
economic situation of commercial agriculture? Es-
sentially that the forces at work in the static picture
are intensified. Real estate prices, already high in
the static picture, keep trending upward. Political
pressures to restrain farm-generated externalities,
but also to preserve the dwindling farm acreage,
increase. The mix of agricultural goods moves fur-
ther toward concentration on land-efficient and
perishable products. And, if the process goes far
enough, as in Manhattan (N.Y.) all the farmland
does eventually disappear into an urban black hole.
Yet the surprising story in the data is how well
agriculture is doing in these areas. While the num-
ber of farms is declining in metro as in nonmetro
areas, the rate of decline is not much higher in
metro areas. Lockeretz (1986) studied paired coun-
ties inside and outside 143 standard metropolitan
areas. The average annual rate of decline in the
number of farms was 2.26 percent in the metro
counties and 2.02 percent in the nonmetro counties
over the period 1944-1982.
Another stream of literature concerning the dy-
namics of urban growth and agriculture has been a
sometimes apocalyptic extrapolation of the idea of
disappearing farmland to a national scale. Aca-
demic interest in the “vanishing farmland crisis”
mushroomed in the 1970s, culminating in the Na-
tional Agricultural Lands Study (NALS, 1981).
While generally circumspect in its conclusions,
this study gave unwarranted oxygen to the idea that
farmland conversion posed a threat to the nation’s
agricultural production capacity (see Fischel,
1982; Dunford, 1983; Heimlich, Vesterby, and
Krupa, 1991).
A dynamic factor that has received more atten-
tion in recent years is the “impermanence syn-
drome, ” described as “the tendency for disinvest-
ment in agricultural activity to occur well in ad-
vance of actual conversion to urban uses”
(Andrews and Lopez, 1989, p, 53). There exist
both a weak and a strong form of this hypothesis.
The weak impermanence syndrome results in a re-
duction in investment in long-lived fixed farm as-
sets (buildings, land improvements such as drain-
age or irrigation) when the probability of conver-
sion before the end of the asset’s normal life is
sufficiently large. The strong form of the hypoth-
esis extends the idea to a reluctance to invest in
(portable) new technology or even to maintain and
replace farm machine~ (Lopez, Adelaja, and An-
drews, p. 347), i.e., the impermanence syndrome
affects mobile as well as fixed capital, and results
in an actual decline in the capital stock per acre.
The result can be farmland held idle in anticipation
of conversion. The same result can occur because
of diseconomies of scale increasing the costs of
marketing and input supply as farms become fewer
in an urbanizing area, Empirical literature has
reached conflicting conclusions on the extent of
disinvestment and “premature” land idling, with
Lopez, Adelaja, and Andrews (1988) confirming
the phenomenon, and Lockeretz (1986) denying its
importance, Simply from the data on sales and
income, it appears that farmers in metropolitan ar-
eas generally are not just going through the mo-
tions of farming while waiting for the developers.
Finally, the dynamics of suburbanizing areas
open up marketing opportunities not available in
rural areas for supplying high-value products con-
taining service or quality dimensions that may
place the producer in the position of essentially
selling a branded (firm-specific) product. Heimlich
and Barnard (1992) investigate farmers in metro-
politan areas who have taken advantage of these
opportunities, denoted by the term “adaptive”
farms. These farms are defined as farms with sales
of more than $10,000, and with sales of more than
$500 per acre or more than one-third of sales com-
posed of high-value products. In a sample of 577
Northeastern farms in metropolitan counties in the
1989 Farm Costs and Returns Survey of USDA,
the adaptive farms had an average net farm income
more than twice the income of’ ‘traditional” metro
farms, and more than twice the income of the av-
erage Northeastern nonmetro farm (Heimlich and
Barnard, p. 54).
Item (iv), high population density and conges-
tion, affects agriculture through increasing some
marketing costs. But more important in recent pol-
icy discussion is the increase in externalities. For
example, the cost of sprayed herbicides which drift
onto a neighbor’s farm is likely to be less than the
perceived cost of herbicide drift into suburban
back yards. At the same time, the increased non-
farm population brings new problems of crime,
congestion, and insecurity to farmers. 1 The pref-
erence for low-density housing and green spaces
that leads people to the suburbs in the first place
also leads them to support policies that will help
maintain farming in metropolitan areas, notably
property tax breaks and farmland preservation pol-
‘ For detailed investigations of the security issues in a highly urban-
ized state, see Lisansky (1986) and Lkansky, Andrews, and Lopez
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icies. Analysis of these issues requires a fuller de-
scription and involves the theory of public choice
or political economy.
Political Economy of Metropolitan Farming
The main areas in which local, state, and occasion-
ally federal regulation influence commercial farm-
ing in metropolitan areas are:
l environmental regulation
l “right-to-farm” legislation
“ preferential property taxation of farmland
l farmland preservation through purchase of de-
velopment rights
l land use regulation (zoning)
Federal environmental regulation affecting agri-
culture includes the Clean Water Act’s Section 404
wetlands protection, the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, the Endangered Species Act, and con-
servation and environmental provisions of the
1985 and 1990 Farm Acts. None of this legislation
singles out farming in metropolitan areas. But the
impacts in some cases are greater in metropolitan
areas because of higher population density. The
expanded Conservation Reserve Program in the
1990 Farm Act is targeted at the goal of water
quality improvement. Farmers’ bids of acreage to
enter the program are benefit-weighted by includ-
ing a number of factors that affect the water quality
benefits of an acre added to the Conservation Re-
serve (Osborn and I-Ieimlich, 1993). One of these
factors is the population density of the area, on the
grounds that the harm caused by a gallon of con-
taminated water is proportional to the probability
that a human will use that water. Moreover, the
1990 Act provisions permit land with a higher mar-
ket value to enter the program by considering en-
vironmental benefits per dollar of rental payment
to the farmer. In fact, the share of Northeastern
land enrolled in the 1992 CRP signup increased 50
percent from the average enrollment of previous
signups. However, it is not known how much of
this acreage is in metropolitan counties.
Local regulation of commercial agricultural ef-
fluent, noise, and odors through zoning and pen-
alties is a subject that has not been comprehen-
sively documented, but which undoubtedly exists
and which has led farm interests to exert political
pressure for “right-to-farm” laws. These laws
have become quite pervasive and have led to an
uneasy political equilibrium between farm and
nonfarm residents of suburban areas (Hand, 1984;
Lisansky, 1986). Most affected have been live-
stock enterprises, which have been largely forced
out of some areas.
An amicable political equilibrium within subur-
ban communities becomes possible because non-
farm residents often agree with farmers on the de-
sirability of keeping farms in metropolitan areas.
Each of the 50 states has a law granting preferen-
tial tax assessment on agricultural land, so that
such land is taxed on the basis of its value in ag-
ricultural use rather than its market value. Taxing
on the basis of market value would hasten the con-
version of metropolitan land from farming to other
uses. However, 31 states have provisions that re-
quire farmers to give back all or part of their tax
preference if their land is subsequently converted
to nonfarm use (Aiken, 1989).
Farmland preservation through other means is
also predominantly a local issue, although the
1990 Farm Act contains a “Farms for the Future”
title with the aim “to promote a national farmland
protection effort” (U.S. Code 104 STAT. 3616).
However, the program has been funded only for a
pilot effort in Vermont, Local and state mecha-
nisms include agricultural districts for the targeting
of tax breaks, purchase of development rights from
owners of farmland, and zoning requiring houses
to be built only on very large lots, up to 160 acres
(Hand, p, 295). There is controversy over the po-
litical reasons for these measures. Dillman (1989)
cites environmental amenities, protecting econo-
mies of scale in service provision, orderly devel-
opment, and a preference for local food sources,
while raising questions about each of these ratio-
nales. Fischel (1989) believes the national-level
debate about allegedly excessive farmland conver-
sion has played a role in providing political cover
for farmland preservation measures, which local
residents want for exclusionary reasons, particu-
larly to keep the urban poor out of their cormnu-
nities.2
Recently an analytical approach to the econom-
ics of regulation and income redistribution has
been developed that may help in sorting out the
political economy of these issues (Peltzman, 1976;
Becker, 1983). The basic issue is characterizing
the political equilibrium in the presence of exter-
nalities; in particular, is the political equilibrium
efficient in the sense of yielding the highest pos-
sible real income (including environmental amen-
ities) given the political forces in play?
2 Some of the discussion in Heirrdich(19S9)seems to view this pref-
erencetendentiouslyas a matterof taste ordkcrimination. But Lkansky,
Andrews and Lopez (19S8) find evidence that there are real external
costs of urbanizationon farming.104 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Consider two interest groups in a suburban area,
farmers and nonfarmers. The well-being of each
that is subject to change by policies is:
wi=Yi+si+Ei, i= 1,2,
where i = 1 for farmers, i = 2 for nonfarrners,
and W is a measure of well-being, composed of Y,
net income (after taxes), S, consumer net rents
(equivalent/compensating variation), E, the value
of environmental amenities.
The policies that have been listed above may be
modelled as either monetary taxes/subsidies or
quantitative restrictions of land use or farm pro-
duction. In a static model of a suburban commu-
nity, we investigate policy issues through compar-
ative statics analogously to the approach in Gard-
ner (1991). For a policy instrument T, we estimate
the effects on each group,
Since the policies are local, assume that T has no
effect on product or factor prices (except for land).
Then dSitdT = O, and dYi/dT # O only through
taxes or subsidies or direct restriction of produc-
tion practices and land use. These restrictions yield
a model simple enough to represent two-
dimensionally.
Figure 1 shows an initial situation with well-
being of farmers and nonfarmers given by the lev-
els of WI and W2 at point E. Policies are then
introduced to regulate farming or land use. For
example, effluent regulation reduces Y1 and in-
creases El and E2. Farmers on net lose because




have been calling for the regulation themselves),3
but for a low level of regulation their net losses are
small. Nonfarmers gain, r3E2/dT > 0, and gain
most rapidly when the first, most egregious prac-
tices are stopped. The effects of different levels of
Ton WI and W2are traced out by the transforma-
tion curve EP2R2.
The main issues concerning such policies are:
l Is a net gain to both farmers and nonfarrners
possible?
l What is the effect of interest-group politics?
l What policy is optimal from an overall social
viewpoint?
A net gain to both farmers and nonfarmers oc-
curs if we move in the direction of the arrow,
northeast from point E in figure 1. This would be
a strict Pareto gain. Most policy instruments, like
the regulations that generate the transformation
curve EPJt2, make one group better off and the
other worse off. But, a policy will cause an in-
crease in the sum of WI and W2if it generates an
equilibrium northeast of the initial sum-of-welfare
line Wo, which has a slope of – 1. The possibility
of a gain in WI + W2 arises because of market
failure. Social optimization of land use with envi-
ronmental amenities, for example, has been ana-
lyzed in detail by McConnell (1989) and Lopez,
Shah, and Altobello (1994).
Under economic regulations as analyzed by
Pekzman, policy intervention moves the economy
inside the W. line, and point E represents the max-
imum attainable level of WI + W2. With respect to
local policies for suburban areas we have both pos-
itive (green space) and negative (pollution) exter-
nalities, as opportunities for policies that will in-
crease W, + W2.
Conceptually, the level of pollution regulation
that maximizes the sum of well-being generates
point P2, the point at which the transformation
curve has a slope of – 1. At this point the marginal
gain to nonfarrners, ~E2/dT, just equals the mar-
ginal loss to farmers, – (C3E1/i)T+ 13Y1/13T,).
Consider an alternative policy, to conserve
green space by giving property tax relief to farm-
ers. This would also generate environmental amen-
ities, but in this case C3Y1/13T > 0. Increasing the
amount of tax relief from zero traces out a trans-
formation curve such as EPIR1. The maximum
sum-of-welfare is at point PI. In this case, farmers
are made better off at the expense of nonfarmers.
3If E, were internal to each farm, there would he no demand for
regulation. The supposition here is that an individual farmer’s acts of
environmentaldegradation affect other farmers; so they call for regula-
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A possible Pareto-superior move is to enact both
regulation and tax breaks at once. Assuming the
effects on farm returns and on environmental ben-
efits are independent—the benefits of agricultural
pollution controls can simply be added to the ben-
efits of green space-then having both policies in
place simultaneously doubles the sum-of-weifare
gains of either PI or P2 separately. In terms of
figure 1, we can think of moving first to Pz via
regulation and then moving to P3 via the tax break.
Thus, it may well be that it makes sense to have
both farmer-costly and farmer-friendly policies in
place at the same time, a situation that has evolved
over time in many locations, with tax breaks first
and regulations later.4 A choice to both regulate
farm practices and preserve farmland through sub-
sidies is not as contradictory as Fischel (1989, p.
201) suggests.
Now consider the consequences of interest-
group politics. Analytically, the simplest proce-
dure is to specify an additive welfare function in
which nonfarmers’ well-being is the numeraire,
while farmers’ well-being has a weight of 0:
w = Ow, + w*.
If 6<1, political choice favors redistribution from
farmers to nonfarmers. In the example of figure 1,
such a political equilibrium is shown at point R2.
Not only is there a large reduction in farmers’ well-
being, but W, + W2 is driven below its no-
nregulationlevel at E. In this sense there is a sub-
stantial deadweight loss to the policy. 5
On the other hand, if farmers were heavily fa-
vored politically, 0> 1, then we would expect to
see an equilibrium like RI. The fact that suburban
communities typically have a mix of environmen-
tal regulation and subsidies to farmers suggests
that farmers and nonfarmers typically have roughly
equal weight in (local) politics.
Note that the analytical approach outlined here
has no place for the “polluter pays” principle.
Who pays depends on (a) political power and (b)
the costs of alternative policies. This is in the spirit
of Cease’s discussion of all externalities being es-
4 An analogoussituation has arisen at the Federal level with respect to
commodity pcograms and environmental regulation. After receiving
price-support benefits for decades, the 1985Famr Act and other legis-
lation has required farmers to meet conservation compliance and
‘‘swampbuster” requirements in order to be eligible for certain com-
modity program benefits.
s Although figure 1 shows a deadweight loss at R2, it is puasible that
environmental regulation could cause a large reduction in W, yet still
yield a gain in W, + W2. It is possible, for example, that the envirmr-
mental regulations that forceddimies north ofLakeOkechobee (Florida)
out of business created a net social gain, because the environmental
damage the diaries caused was even larger than their financial losses
from having to relocate.
sentially reciprocal (Cease, 1960). When a dairy is
located near a house whose residents do not like
the smell of a feedlot, the principal economic issue
is not a matter of rights (to farm or to breathe air
free of cow-sign) but of costs of alternative policy
interventions. The prediction of political efficiency
in environmental regulation is that local gover-
nmentswill adopt the least costly of relocating the
dairies, deodorizing the dairies, placing barriers
between dairies and residents, or residents living
with the odors.
Two paradigmatic legal cases that bear on this
issue are cited in Hand (1984). In Rowe V. Walker
(1982)
the defendant was the owner of a ten-acre parcel
of land in a neighborhood of similar holdings
approximately fifty miles from Detroit. Soon af-
ter he bought the property in 1969, the defen-
dant began a corn-farming operation which grew
to encompass approximately 1600 acres of
leased land. In order to process his corn, he
purchased a large grain dryer which, according
to neighbors, was a nuisance because of the
noise it produced. When defendant Walker and
his neighbors were unable to settle their differ-
ences, ten owners of neighboring properties
filed suit, alleging first a violation of deed re-
strictions and second that the defendant was op-
erating a nuisance. Defendant Walker filed a
motion for summary judgment on the nuisance
claim, raising the Michigan Right-to-Farm Act
as a defense (Hand, p. 311).
The defendant prevailed despite the fact that he
began the objectionable practices after the nonfarrn
residents were in place.
In the second case, in the absence of right-to-
farm legislation, Spur Industries, a feedlot opera-
tor,
began operation in an area far removed from
development. Several years later a developer,
Del Webb, began a massive residential commu-
nity which developed in the direction of the
feedlot operation.
Del Webb soon found it difficult to sell resi-
dences on its property in the vicinity of the feed-
lot and filed suit to enjoin the feedlot operation.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that Del Webb
was entitled to an injunction against Spur, de-
spite the fact that it had come to the nuisance,
This victory turned out to be a pyrrhic one for
the developer, because the court also concluded
that Del Webb, ‘‘[h]aving brought people to the
nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of Spur”
should be required to indemnify Spur for the106 April 1994 Agriculwral and Resource Economics Review
costs of moving or shutting down (Hand, p.
348).
In both cases, being there first did not prevail
when there was an indication that changes were on
net advantageous to both sides together. The legal
framework and “grandfather” priorities did play a
key role in who paid whom. Thus, the courts here
seem to be fulfilling the Coasian functions of min-
imizing transactions costs by assigning liability
while permitting economic activity to be con-
ducted efficiently.
In practice, the big departure from what might
be called a politically driven optimum appears to
be the conflict of interest, emphasized by Fischel
(1989) and others in the Heimlich (1989) volume,
involving farmers and nonfarmers in the suburbs
versus people who live outside the suburban area
but would like to move in. The outsiders are ex-
pected to have a very low (3in local suburban pol-
itics. For this reason, from the perspective of over-
all welfare one needs to be wary of the Florida
land-use planner whom Heimstra (1989, p. 115)
quotes as saying ‘‘what we do need out of the Feds
is for them to stay out of the way while local gov-
ernments do their thing. ” The political situation is
similar to that of immigration policy at the national
level, but in local regulation the case for omitting
the interests of “foreigners” is weaker.
Trends in Metropolitan Agriculture
Table I summarizes information about farms in a
sample of 42 metropolitan counties, in a “greater
Northeast” region bounded by North Carolina to
the South and Illinois to the West. The sample
includes only counties that had at least 100 farms
in the 1987 Agriculture Census. The range is from
counties from which farms have largely disap-
peared (Westchester, NY; DuPage, IL) to counties
in smaller metropolitan areas in which over three-
fourths of the land area remains in farms (Henry,
IL; Shelby, IN; Pickaway, OH). The percentage
population increase in these counties ranges from
well over doubling (Rockingham, NH; Wake, NC;
Chesterfield, VA) to an actual population decline
(Erie, NY; Oneida, NY).
The simple average percentage loss in farm
numbers in these counties between the agriculture
censuses of 1964 and 1987 was 41 percent. This is
a substantial loss, but perhaps surprisingly close to
the 34 percent farm number decline for the United
States as a whole. On the other hand, farmland
acreage did fall much more sharply in metropolitan
areas, with a 32 percent reduction in the sample
metropolitan counties and a 13 percent U.S. ag-
gregate decline.
Heimlich and Barnard (1992) and Lopez,
Adelaja, and Andrews (1988) have provided help-
ful analyses of the economic situation of metropol-
itan agriculture. The following regressions use the
sample counties to explore a little further the issue
of longer-term survival of agriculture in metropol-
itan areas, and some of the linkages with policy,
The linear regression coefficients of Table 2
show the effects of characteristics of counties on
rates of change of farming activity. Two indicators
are used as dependent variables, one based on
acreage in farms and the other on the number of
farms,
In column (1), the dependent variable is the per-
centage change between 1964 and 1987 in a coun-
ty’s farmland, using the U.S. Census Bureau def-
inition of a farm and land in farms. The coeffi-
cients of the independent variables provide
empirical evidence for some hypotheses of the pre-
ceding discussion. The first independent variable
is the rate of growth of total county population,
which averaged 58.9 percent for these counties be-
tween 1960 and 1990, compared to a 38.7 percent
growth rate for the overall U.S. population. The
coefficient of – .11 for this variable in regression
(1) implies that a 100 percent growth (i.e., dou-
bling) of a county’s population generates an 11
percent decline in the county’s farmland, ceteris
paribus.
The only policy variables consistently available
concern state-average property taxes. Line 4 shows
the effects of average property taxes per acre and
line 5 shows the effects of changes in taxes per
acre between 1960 and 1990. All of the sample
counties had use-value taxation for farmland, but
in all except 9 midwestem counties there are lim-
itations on the use of qualifying farmland and/or
“recapture” provisions that require repayment of
property tax relief if development occurs. Line 6 is
a dummy variable = 1 for the 9 counties with no
limitations on the tax break, and = Ootherwise.
The only significant variable is the change in farm-
land taxes, indicating that property tax reduction—
which occurred on average in these counties—
played a role in keeping some land in farms.
The dependent variable in the regression re-
ported in column (2) of Table 2 is the percentage
change in the number of farms. Farm numbers are
less strongly linked to the county’s rate of popu-
lation growth than is farm acreage, On the other
hand, the county’s median household income ap-
pears significant in stemming the loss of farms, butGardner Commercial Agriculture in Metropolitan Areas 107
Table 1. Data for Sample of Metropolitan Counties
Percentage of
Farm Land Change (%) Change (%) Change (%)
Farm (acres) to in Total in Farm in Farm
Numbers Total Land Population Numbers Land Acres


























































































































































































































































































not farmland. The coefficient of .005 in line 2
means that an increase of $1000 (1960 dollars) in
per household income cuts the rate of decline of
farm numbers by 5 percentage points (e.g., from
– 42 percent to – 37 percent). The overall eco-
nomic story is that urban development definitely
places downward pressure on farmers and farming,
but in a more affluent area farming, but not nec-
essarily farmland, is better preserved. This con-
fiis the point of Heimlich and Barnard (1992)
that adaptive farmers, who achieve increased mar-
ketable value per acre from their operations, can
thrive in a metropolitan setting.
Nonetheless, there is inexorable pressure to re-
place farming with nonfarm activities, and this is
especially true in counties containing central cities.
In this sample, 27 counties contain the central city
of the metropolitan area, and 15 are suburban.108 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. Regression Coeftlcients Showing
Rate of Change in Metropolitan Farms as a
Function of County Characteristics
Dependent Variable
(1) (2)
Percent Change Percent Change
in Farmland, in Farms,
Independent Variables 1964-1987 1964-1987
1. % change in county –.110
population (4.2~





4. property tax rate per .407
acreb (1.5)
5, change in pro erty
r
– .489
taxes per acre (2.6)
6, unlimited farm use- – 1.37
vahre taxation (= 1) (0.4)
7. initial farmland share .534





















Line 3 of Table 2 shows the effects of a dummy
variable = 1 for the 27 central-city counties and
= Ofor the others. The decline in farm numbers is
14.4 percentage points greater in the central-city
counties, ceteris paribus.
Summary
The evidence in this sample of counties and in the
more detailed empirical studies cited earlier indi-
cate that the mix of economic and political forces
in metropolitan areas has resulted in a better out-
come than might have been expected for commer-
cial agriculture in metropolitan areas. Farms sur-
vive in metro areas by adapting to urban-area prod-
uct demand, by undertaking more diverse farm
enterprises and by producing higher-value per acre
products with a larger service component than non-
metro farms. While farms and farmland will con-
tinue to succumb to dense urbanization, continued
expansion of suburban areas is likely to maintain
and perhaps even increase the importance of agri-
culture suited to metropolitan areas in the United
States.
However, the present state of knowledge about
these phenomena is still quite weak. Many ques-
tions about the dynamics of agricultural adjustment
to urbanization, and about a possible steady state
equilibrium mix of farming and nonfarm activities
remain open. It is not clear, for example, how
effective farmland preservation activities are over
the longer term. With respect to political economy,
the systematic empirical analysis of local/state pol-
icies influencing agriculture in suburban areas has
barely begun, and the relevant spatial economic
theory remains to be developed in both static and
dynamic versions. Heimlich and Barnard (1992)
made a good start in using USDA’s Farm Costs
and Returns data to throw light on some of the
issues. More remains to be done with these data
and with the more traditional county data from the
U.S. Censuses of Agriculture and Population. In
sum, in terms of economic theory, policy analysis,
and empirical investigation metropolitan agricul-
ture is ripe to become one of the most exciting
research areas for agricultural economists,
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